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**1962/10/30**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: G - U. Alexis Johnson  
FROM: ARA - Edwin M. Martin  
SUBJECT: Invasion

I. Problem

To determine the precise interpretation of the undertaking in the President's letter of October 27, 1962: "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba."

II. Discussion

The United States undertaking was offered contingent upon Soviet agreement to remove the offensive weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate UN observation and supervision and to undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. Assuming the Soviet agreement is fulfilled to United States satisfaction the current situation (i.e. the presence in Cuba of offensive weapons systems) will have been altered. Consequently, a judgment to invade Cuba based upon the presence of these weapons systems would have to be altered accordingly. A judgment that an invasion of Cuba is either required or warranted, therefore, has depended and should continue to depend upon the political-military situation in Cuba and/or Cuba's external actions.

By giving assurances against an invasion of Cuba, the United States has not relinquished its inherent right of self-defense nor have we agreed to forego the possibility of an invasion of Cuba should situations arise in which the provisions of the Rio Treaty or the Punta del Este resolutions would be applicable and the use of armed force were recommended.

Nor does the United States assurance pertain to indirect aggression, support of refugee activities against Cuba, United States commando raids, or substantial United States military support in response to request from a Cuban government which we recognize in lieu of the Castro regime.

Finally,

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REVIEWED BY *Edwin M. Martin* DATE *3/8/82*

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Finally, the assurance is not intended to underwrite the permanence of the Castro regime.

Our assurance does mean that after the offensive weapons systems are removed we would not engage in a massive invasion of Cuba, provided future actions on the part of Cuba and/or the Soviet Bloc do not warrant such action.

To describe at this time precisely what we mean and do not mean by the assurance against invasion (along the above lines) although reassuring to our Latin American friends, would, however, fortify Castro's position that the assurance against invasion does not go far enough. Castro insistence upon broader guarantees in the light of our definitions could thwart the current negotiations.

Recommendation

That the United States adopt the position that the President's letter with respect to assurances against an invasion of Cuba speaks for itself and requires no further elaboration.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

ARA:RAH:urwitch:dr

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